Normative Dimensions of Consenual Application of Black Box Artificial Intelligence in Administrative Adjudication of Benefits Claims by Pasquale, Frank
03_PASQUALE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2021 3:35 PM 
NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF 
CONSENSUAL APPLICATION OF BLACK 
BOX ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OF 




Recent calls for administrative austerity have included demands that agencies 
do more with less as they make decisions about benefit eligibility.1 This economic 
logic dovetails with a business case for automating consideration of disputes. The 
field of computational legal studies suggests ways of deploying natural language 
processing to triage case filings, or otherwise to find patterns in past adjudications 
in order to inform (or even complete) the resolution of disputes.2 For example, a 
certain combination of medical records may have always led to an award of 
disability benefits in the past. Administrators may decide to fast track such claims 
or may even decide to award benefits on the basis of those medical records. 
Conversely, claims that look too unlike past, successful claims, may be rejected 
at the outset, ideally with some instructions as to how they may be improved. 
In the longer term, more ambitious surveillance programs may feed into 
administrative adjudications. For example, there are calls in the United States to 
review the eligibility of benefits recipients via evidence that could include 
surveillance of their social media feeds.3 However, using black box AI to deny 
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1.  JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 145, 170 (2019) (discussing neoliberal
managerialism in the judiciary and administrative state). 
2.  See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE AND DANIEL N. ROCKMORE, EDS., LAW AS DATA:
COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (2019); RYAN WHALEN, ED., 
COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN RESEARCH 
(2020). 
3.  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET OVERVIEW 17–18 (2018),
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY19Files/2019BO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CJH-NZPQ] (“We will study and 
design successful strategies of our private sector counterparts to determine if a disability adjudicator 
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benefits is an untested and dangerous proposal. Even when algorithms are 
transparent, problems arise. For example, Australia’s CentreLink agency used 
defective algorithms and data to mail thousands of letters to claimants 
demanding return of alleged overpayments. Many were inaccurate, causing a 
great deal of distress among those who received the demand letters.4 
Nevertheless, there are promising avenues for automation of law. Tax 
scholars have argued that as many as 100 million filed tax returns in the United 
States each year may be unnecessary, wasting millions of hours of tedious form-
filling and record-keeping. Instead, the government could simply automatically 
decide the tax liability of persons who take the standard deduction.5 With more 
advanced data, and tax laws written to be machine-readable, even complex 
returns may be automated.6 Thus, automated administration offers both 
promising possibilities and clear warning signs with respect to potential negative 
consequences.7 
Black box AI may eventually play an important role in several of the use cases 
mentioned so far. For purposes of this Article, “black box AI” refers to any 
natural language processing, machine learning, textual analysis, or similar 
software which uses data not accessible to the data subject, and/or which deploys 
algorithms which are either similarly inaccessible, or so complex that they cannot 
be reduced to a series of rules and rule applications comprehensible to the data 
subject.8 
There are many ways in which governments may deploy black box AI in 
administrative adjudications. For example, they may apply it to all claimants, or 
only those who consent to its use. Further, they may apply its algorithms only to 
materials submitted by claimants, or they may sweep a wider set of data into the 
 
should access and use social media networks to evaluate disability allegations. Currently, agency 
adjudicators may use social media information to evaluate a beneficiary’s symptoms only when there is 
an OIG CDI unit’s Report of Investigation that contains social media data corroborating the investigative 
findings. Our study will determine whether the further expansion of social media networks in disability 
determinations will increase program integrity and expedite the identification of fraud.”). 
 4.  See Terry Carney, The New Digital Future for Welfare: Debts Without Legal Proofs or Moral 
Authority?, U. NEW S. WALES L.J. F., Mar. 2018, at 1–2. Carney has observed more recently that while 
automated implementation of welfare schemes may contribute to unfairness, deeper problems in the 
Australian welfare system may be the root cause of recent scandals. See Terry Carney, Artificial 
Intelligence in Welfare: Striking the Vulnerability Balance? 46 MONASH U. L. REV., no. 2, 2020, at 3. 
 5.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS 103–07 (2008) (arguing 
for the elimination of most deductions and credits in order to simplify tax liability). Automation is already 
in widespread use at the IRS. Danielle K. Citron & Ryan Calo, The Automated Administrative State: A 
Crisis of Legitimacy, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11) (on file with author) (describing 
how the IRS already is using algorithmic processes to decide whom to audit). 
 6.  See Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60, 78 (2017) (arguing for default 
logic based statutes because “[a]rtificial intelligence based on default logic can more easily encode 
statutes and extract information from statutes than artificial intelligence based on standard logic.”). 
 7.  See Citron & Calo, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that erroneous rules led to automated systems 
violating the due process guarantees of beneficiaries in the public benefits arena). 
 8.  This definition is developed in Chapter 1 of FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: 
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
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black box AI’s purview. This Article will typologize key normative concerns 
raised even in scenarios where black box AI is consented to by the claimant.9 Part 
II examines the normative desirability of consent-based black box AI use cases 
involving materials submitted by the claimant. Part III analyzes use cases 
involving a wider universe of materials not submitted by the claimant. I conclude 




NORMATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING BLACK BOX AI USED TO PROCESS 
SUBMITTED MATERIALS 
A deal between the litigant and the state to permit the state or its 
instrumentalities to use black box AI to analyze submitted materials will likely 
have more procedural legitimacy than a deal permitting the use of a wider 
universe of data. Litigants can control what they submit, taking on responsibility 
for “quality control” and accuracy. Nevertheless, there are important, often 
unexpected side effects of such agreements which need further illumination, 
mitigation, or elimination before they are embraced. 
Simply treating a certain class of persons better than others on the basis of 
black box AI highlights a deep tension between utilitarian ethics and the rule of 
law. Despite the compelling utilitarian rationale for such automated adjudication 
of benefits, it is difficult to fit the “determination” at issue into classic 
administrative law categories of rule or order, fact or law. Is the hypothetical 
matching based on similarities between past and current applications a legal or 
factual determination? Perhaps the two can be split apart so that the relevant 
NLP is limited to only reviewing the facts section of the claimant’s submission, or 
only the law section. Yet this possibility would undermine the legitimacy of the 
NLP, since there should be some connection between the facts and the law in 
even the most summary determination. 
Further problems arise when considering the significance and purpose behind 
distinctions made by black box AI. Assume, for example, that the entire 
submission is reviewed via a comparison with similar, past submissions. The key 
question then becomes, what is the nature of the similarity discovered?10 If the 
similarity is only based on something superficial (say, the number of periods and 
 
 9.  I save for future work an assessment of the imposition of black box AI without consent, or the 
use of black box AI to preemptively award benefits before a case is actually adjudicated. For a typology 
of the general types of issues raised by the opacity of data and its processing, and the revisability of 
judgments, in adjudications, see Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While 
Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2014). 
 10.  Perhaps there is no similarity analogous to the types of reasoning done by extant forms of legal 
analysis. The NLP may be doing something sui generis, as Judge Geneviève Vanderstichele has suggested 
in her illuminating work. See Geneviève Vanderstichele, The Normative Value of Legal Analytics. Is 
There a Case for Statistical Precedent? (Aug. 30, 2020) (MPhil thesis, University of Oxford), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474878 [https://perma.cc/FRY2-2K2W]. 
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punctuation marks in the document, or the presence of certain words with ample 
synonyms used in other, unsuccessful submissions, ceteris paribus), the problem 
of arbitrariness rears its ugly head.11 While arbitrary “givings” may not be nearly 
as problematic as arbitrary takings, they nevertheless raise serious questions 
about the specifically legal nature of the AI in question.12 
Given these concerns about black box AI relying on arbitrary distinctions, 
why not simply use NLP to identify the neediest cases based on some algorithm 
of merit or urgency? This seems like a more plausible goal for NLP than the more 
complex question of applying law to facts (ramified, as it necessarily is, by 
theories of interpretation, precedent, and internal guidance on limits to the 
number of claims that can be granted).13 An algorithm of neediness may assist as 
pure description (albeit value-laden) of some dimension of the claimant’s case. 
However, those crafting such algorithms must be very attentive to the advice of 
members of the relevant communities (here, of poor and disabled persons), lest 
the system be biased.14 Moreover, a “neediest case” black box AI developer 
should be attentive to long-standing debates over just principles of allocation of 
resources.15 
 
 11.  Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism, 
68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63, 75 (2018) (“[T]he entire ‘predictive’ project . . . may be riddled with spurious 
correlations. As any student of statistics knows, if one tests enough data sets against one another, spurious 
correlations will emerge.”). 
 12.  I use the category “givings” as defined in Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 
YALE L.J. 547, 549 n.2 (2001). 
 13.  As Yoshua Bengio explains: “[a]nother big challenge is natural language understanding . . . [is] 
still not at the level where we would say the machine understands. That would be when we could read a 
paragraph and then ask any question about it, and the machine would basically answer in a reasonable 
way, as a human would. We are still far from that.” Will Knight, Will Machines Eliminate Us?, MIT TECH. 
REV., Jan. 29, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/01/29/162084/will-machines-eliminate-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/5W4R-8A5P]. 
 14.  VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY (1st ed. 2018); Seeta Pe a Gangadharan, 
Digital Inclusion and Data Profiling, 17 FIRST MONDAY (2012), https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v17i5.3821 
[https://perma.cc/Z23L-8UXS]; Michele E. Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 25 
(2008); Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, & Vincent M. Southerland, Litigating Algorithms 2019 
US Report: New Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, A.I. NOW INST. (2019), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/E778-JA5M]; Litigating 
Algorithms: Challenging Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems, A.I. NOW INST. (2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SKQ-BW9X]; Dillon Reisman, 
Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford, & Meredith Whittaker, Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical 
Framework for Public Agency Accountability, A.I. NOW INST. (2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2CQ-FMF9]. For an example of the perils 
apparent here, see K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703 (D. Idaho 2016) (a case hinging on application 
of a widely criticized algorithm to benefits determinations). 
 15.  The diversity of theories of distributive justice, and differences between them, matter, too. For 
instance, “Amartya Sen illustrates these differences with a story about three children and a flute. One 
child justifies her claim to the flute because she is the only one of the three who can play and would 
therefore receive the most pleasure from owning the flute. Another child claims the flute on the ground 
that he is impoverished and has no toys of his own; the flute would therefore increase his happiness and 
his share of economic goods. The third child demands the flute because she actually made the flute; she 
therefore has a right to the flute because it is the product of her own labor. How we resolve the question 
of which child receives the flute will likely depend on whether we favor utilitarian, economic egalitarian, 
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Including more “humans in the loop” of decisionmaking may also ameliorate 
the alienating effects of black box AI. The legal scholar Guido Noto La Diega 
has categorized several rationales for avoiding the dehumanization of decision-
making in law generally, many of which apply here.16 He gives “good reasons not 
to trust” algorithms, even when they meet some standard of accuracy with respect 
to a given dataset: 
First, design choices make the decisionmaking process or the factors it considers too 
opaque; these choices may also limit the control of the designer. Second, the output of 
the system may be affected by the biases in data collection. Third, unlike human beings, 
algorithms cannot balance biases in interpretation of data by a conscious attention to 
the redress of the bias. Fourth, there are biases in the ways that learning algorithms are 
tuned based on the testing users’ behavior. Fifth, algorithms may be designed for a 
purpose, but then inserted into systems designed for other purposes. Lastly . . . another 
factor is the biases in the data used to train the decision-making systems.17 
To be sure, there are many dedicated attorneys, computer scientists, 
philosophers, and social scientists now working to address concerns like these.18 
Indeed, the fields of AI ethics and algorithmic accountability will have much to 
contribute to law in coming decades. However, even if researchers and 
policymakers manage to address all the concerns mentioned by La Diega, there 
is still the “role reversibility” problem raised by Stephen Henderson and Kiel 
Brennan-Marquez.19 Their argument is that “in a liberal democracy, there must 
be an aspect of ‘role-reversibility’ to judgment.  Those who exercise judgment 
should be vulnerable, reciprocally, to its processes and effects.”20 The problem 
with AI case determination, or even some super-sophisticated robot judge, is that 
is cannot experience punishment the way that a human being would. Role-
reversibility is necessary for “decision-makers to take the process seriously, 
respecting the gravity of decision-making from the perspective of affected 
parties.” Brennan-Marquez & Henderson derive this ideal from basic principles 
of self-governance: 
In a democracy, citizens do not stand outside the process of judgment, as if responding, 
in awe or trepidation, to the proclamations of an oracle.  Rather, we are collectively 
responsible for judgment.  Thus, the party charged with exercising judgment—who 
could, after all, have been any of us—ought to be able to say: This decision reflects 
 
or libertarian conceptions of justice.” Shannon M. Roesler, Addressing Environmental Injustices: A 
Capability Approach to Rulemaking, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 49, 60 (2011) (citing AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA 
OF JUSTICE 12–14 (2009)). Even within egalitarian conceptions of merit, which would include a “neediest 
cases” algorithm, the concept of need may be defined differently by different groups. 
 16.  Guido Noto La Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making –– Algorithmic 
Decisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, J. 
INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-COM. L., no. 9, 2018, https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-9-1-2018/4677 
[https://perma.cc/C6ST-PRJ7]. 
 17.  Id. at 8–9. 
 18.  ACM CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY (Jan. 14, 2021) 
https://facctconference.org/ [https://perma.cc/S9CV-4ECK]. 
 19.  See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-
Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2019). 
 20.  Id. at 140. 
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constraints that we have decided to impose on ourselves, and in this case, it just so happens 
that another person, rather than I, must answer to them.  And the judged party—who 
could likewise have been any of us—ought to be able to say: This decision-making 
process is one that we exercise ourselves, and in this case, it just so happens that another 
person, rather than I, is executing it.21 
Thus, for Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, “even assuming role-reversibility 
will not improve the accuracy of decision-making, it still has intrinsic value.”22 
There are of course some challenges to this position from devotees of robot 
“personhood.” They may claim that a robot programmed to be terrified of being 
confined or turned off or denied electric power, for example, would be able to 
“empathize” before it imposed imprisonment, the death penalty, or a benefits 
denial, on a person. But a silicon-based machine (that is replicable and 
replaceable) could offer only a simulation of terror (and, a fortiori, empathy) that 
carbon-based, irreplaceable, dependent, rational animals like ourselves actually 
feel at the prospect of serious disadvantage.23 Brennan-Marquez and 
Henderson’s recognition of this ontological divide should be foundational for 
future work on AI and law, as it underscores an ineliminable advantage of human 
over machine judgment. 
Another line of critique would emphasize the distance of many jurists from 
the experience of the persons’ they are passing judgment on. Judges and other 
legal decisionmakers often lead lives far removed from those subject to their 
decisions, and this problem is particularly acute in benefits cases, where the 
decisionmaker usually enjoys a secure, middle class job, and the claimant is 
financially insecure. Nevertheless, there is still some basic grounding of common 
experience of such judges and persons judged, which can never be attained by 
entities that do not share a common biological substrate, which underwrites the 
experiences of mortality and natality that Hannah Arendt described so well as 
foundational to the human condition.24 
Brennan-Marquez & Henderson build on a long tradition of scholarship 
which focuses on the intrinsic value of legal and deliberative processes, rather 
than their instrumental value. Their focus runs against the grain of a utilitarian 
American legal tradition that, while immensely influential for decades, does not 
exhaust our ethical commitments—and often manages to entirely misconceive 
them. For example, applications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous Mathews v. 
Eldridge calculus have frequently failed to take into account the effects of 
abbreviated procedures on claimants’ dignity—what George Kateb describes as 
a foundational commitment to respect.25  
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 142. 
 23.  FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE 
OF AI (2020), chapter 8; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN 
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999). 
 24.  HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). 
 25.  Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976) 
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As Brennan-Marquez and Henderson show, bureaucracies, including the 
judiciary, have enormous power. They owe litigants a chance to plead their case 
to someone who can understand and experience, on a visceral level, the boredom 
and violence portended by a prison stay, the brutal need resulting from the loss 
of benefits, the sense of shame that liability for drunk driving or pollution can 
give rise to. And as the classic administrative law case Morgan v. U.S. held, even 
in complex administrative processes, the one who hears must be the one who 
decides.26 Brennan-Marquez and Henderson teach that it is not adequate for 
persons to play mere functionary roles, gathering data for more authoritative 
machines. Rather, persons must take responsibility for the transparency and 




NORMATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING BLACK BOX AI USED TO PROCESS A 
WIDER UNIVERSE OF MATERIALS NOT SUBMITTED BY THE CLAIMANT 
The concerns discussed in Part II apply to the use of black box AI in 
administrative adjudications of benefits when they are based on materials 
submitted by claimants. Black box AI that utilizes a wider universe of materials 
beyond those submitted by claimants poses additional and distinct normative 
considerations. Nevertheless, at some point in the future, this technology may 
become a feature of our legal system. 
Consider a kind of automated benefit determination where a kiosk may take 
a claimant’s picture and then use facial recognition technology to connect the 
claimant to all manner of databases of spreadsheet entries about, surveillance 
camera footage of, and audiorecordings of the claimant.27 A voice like that of 
Google Assistant, Siri, or Alexa may state to the claimant that the case will be 
based not only on written submissions, but also on surveillance of what the 
claimant has been doing in public and on social media for the past several months. 
Given the intense scrutiny of factual matters that are part of the standard for 
claiming disability, a wide variety of data may be canvassed by such AI. It may 
assess whether the claimant been seen exercising vigorously, or standing and 
walking for more than four hours in a row. Does the claimant’s phone 
 
(“Decisions with substantial ‘moral worth’ connotations are generally expected to be highly 
individualized and attentive to subjective evidence. The adjudication of such issues on the basis of 
documents submitted largely by third parties and by adjudicators who have never confronted the 
claimant seems inappropriate. Instead, a court approaching an analysis of the disability claims process 
from the dignitary perspective might emphasize those aspects of disability decisions that focus on a 
particular claimant’s vocational characteristics, his unique response to his medical condition, and the 
ultimate predictive judgment of whether the claimant should be able to work.”); GEORGE KATEB, 
HUMAN DIGNITY 1 (2011). 
 26.  Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936). 
 27.  I offer this hypothetical in the spirit of a Dennett-ian “intuition pump.” DANIEL C. DENNETT, 
INTUITION PUMPS AND OTHER TOOLS FOR THINKING 5–7 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1st ed. 2013). 
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accelerometer and related tracking technology disclose a gait that correlates with 
the gait of those previously found disabled? How many applications for jobs has 
the claimant submitted? All these factors may be commensurated and 
compressed down to a single score to assess likelihood of disability. Should such 
assessments play a role in administrative adjudications? This hypothetical system, 
involving black box AI that uses a wide universe of data concerning many aspects 
of the claimant’s life, raises considerations distinct from those raised by black box 
AI analysis of the claimant’s own submissions alone. 
The surveillance such a system entails is deeply alienating in two important 
senses of the term. First, there is a sense of powerlessness, in that this automation 
furthers “the alienation of man from man, and the degradation of men into 
commodities.”28 Persons are simply processed, like any other commodity, with 
observable behavior displacing experience and explanation. In other words, 
direct person-to-person communication and interpretation are displaced by 
behaviorist computation.29 The black box AI may have been programmed by 
persons, but there is little to no chance of their interaction with the claimant—or 
the claimant being able to influence the selection and processing of the pivotal 
information. 
The second sense of alienation here is that black box AI can create 
meaninglessness regarding choices and rules. As sociologist Melvin Seeman 
explains: “We may speak of high alienation, in the meaninglessness usage, when 
the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe—when the individual’s 
minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met.”30 Black box AI 
can create this condition, leaving the objects of its surveillance uncertain, 
menaced, and second-guessing themselves. “Am I walking too fast,” one might 
ask, “demonstrating that I really am fit for work?” Or “is this website visit too 
long, some evidence of distraction from jobseeking?”31 Policymakers should not 
encourage the development of such all-encompassing self-suspicion.32 
Ethical problems proliferate as we consider the potential scope of 
surveillance. First, there is the normalization of data–gathering in spaces that 
 
 28.  Melvin Seeman, On the Meaning of Alienation, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 783–84 (1959). 
 29.  On the deep connections between AI and behaviorism, see ERIK J. LARSON, THE MYTH OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2021). 
 30.  Id. at 786. See also Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent 
Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019) (explaining the alienation resulting from AI decision-making 
and setting forth proposals for alleviating it). 
 31.  For a preview of the type of unexpected data analysis that might occur, consider a recent study 
which predicted persons’ likelihood of being in car accidents from Google Maps images of their homes. 
KINGA KITA-WOJCIECHOWSKA, & ŁUKASZ KIDZI SKI, GOOGLE STREET VIEW IMAGE OF A HOUSE 
PREDICTS CAR ACCIDENT RISK OF ITS RESIDENT (2019), 
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1904/1904.05270.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQM9-LP8M]. 
 32.  See MARK ANDREJEVIC, AUTOMATED MEDIA 77 (1st ed. 2020) (examining how threats of 
surveillance and future punishment subordinate individual rights); Julie E. Cohen, What is Privacy For?, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013) (discussing modulation); NEIL M. RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY 
MATTERS (2021).  
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have justifiably been considered improper for outside surveillance. Second, there 
is a power differential between the state and the claimant. Government should 
not take advantage of the vulnerability of claimants to upend long-established 
social expectations of privacy. Otherwise, it may create what is effectively a 
competition for exposure among claimants, each worried that if they fail to agree 
to certain forms of surveillance via the black box AI (or convincingly performing 
in areas where such surveillance is possible), they risk losing benefits. 
All these objections may seem to melt before the universal solvent of consent. 
However, the validity of consent is in question when much of the data and 
analysis ostensibly consented to is opaque to the claimant. And even if that 
objection can be overcome by providing some generalized description of the data 
and analysis, other normative problems emerge at a societal level. The 
competitive dimensions of “consented” disclosure ensure that social conditions 
can easily render the proposed deal coercive over time. Once a critical mass of 
persons has agreed to the big data analysis, to resist surveillance is to risk 
stigmatizing oneself as a person with something to hide. Legislators need to 
ensure that there is a common and inalienable right against being surveilled by 
intrusive new technologies, particularly when some arms of the state may 
weaponize their existing delays and dysfunction to force claimants into 
competing for favorable treatment by sacrificing their privacy.33 
Unfortunately, the law has been trending in the opposite direction in cognate 
areas. It has required residents of public housing to give up basic rights as a 
condition of benefits, as Rachel Hannaford has described in Trading Due Process 
Rights for Shelter.34 When this unfair bargain was challenged in Department of 
Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,35 the Supreme Court did not even 
address the petitioners’ unconstitutional conditions claims directly.36 From a 
purely contractarian perspective, this perspective makes sense: let the petitioners 
find other shelter if they do not find the terms of public housing amenable. 
However, this formalistic view elides the many challenges to dignity such one-
sided leases impose on some of the most vulnerable persons in our society. Their 
marginalization deserves remedial attention, rather than being treated as one 
more point of vulnerability to be exploited. 
 
 
 33.  Privacy concerns are particularly relevant given the centrality of the applicant’s body in U.S. 
disability determinations, which consider (inter alia) whether a claimant has a “severe medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment” (or combination of impairments). 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 
(2019). The centrality of the body in privacy law and theory is a normative dimension of data protection 
of long standing. See ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011). 
 34.  Rachel Hannaford, Trading Due Process Rights for Shelter: Rucker and Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Public Housing Leases, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2003). 
 35.  See Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
 36.  See id. at 136 n.6 (shutting down respondents’ attempts to raise constitutional challenges). 
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Despite the threats to privacy it portends, black box AI has already garnered 
interest from some academics as a method for automating certain legal 
determinations. Indeed, a recent conference on personalized law at the 
University of Chicago showcased proposals to dynamically adapt legal 
requirements for individuals and corporations based on automated or semi-
automated analysis of vast quantities of data collected about them.37 Expectations 
about the increasing volume, variety, and velocity of even more data about states 
of the world (and persons) grounds more ambitious visions of a future of  law 
driven by big data.38 Advanced technology can also promote a combination of 
approaches, such as smart contracts and personalization. At its limit, this vision 
replaces rules and standards with “microdirectives,” specific requirements fusing 
factual determinations and legal control of behavior.39 For example, a traffic 
authority may alter the speed limit driver by driver, based on drivers’ history of 
accidents and moving violations. Such personalization imports a utilitarian 
reasoning common in antitrust’s measurement of consumer welfare, to law 
generally.40 In other words, from this Benthamite perspective, law’s primary goal 
is to optimize some objective function (such as speed and convenience traded off 
against risk of injury and death).41 Such an objective function can be extrapolated 
into the future based on analysis of the past (say, when deaths and injuries 
reached an unacceptable level, based on the speed of driving of individuals like 
those who are now being regulated). 
The problems with such an approach are twofold. Black box AI could be 
inaccurate or unfair, and resistant to the usual corrective procedures that have 
helped mitigate other sources of unfairness and inaccuracy. Moreover, its 
widespread imposition may be deeply alienating. We are only in the beginning 
stages of articulating proper channels for collective governance of such scenarios. 
Without such collective governance, we risk moving seamlessly from the 
 
 37.  See Symposium on Personalized Law, 86 CHI. L. REV. 217 (2019) (including various articles on 
this topic). 
 38.  See VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 174–78 (2013) (discussing how big data can 
influence how laws are applied and legal decision-making); IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY 
THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 77–78 (2008) (highlighting the use of big data 
to reveal that longer sentences for criminal defendants do not have an impact on recidivism rates). 
 39.  Anthony Case & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1401 
(2017) (“A microdirective, like a rule, provides a clear instruction to a citizen on how to comply with the 
law. But, like a standard, a microdirective is tailored to and adapts to each and every context.”). 
 40.  See WILLIAM DAVIES, THE LIMITS OF NEOLIBERALISM: AUTHORITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE LOGIC OF COMPETITION (2015). 
 41. See generally, Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1789) https://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html [https://perma.cc/96MC-F7JD]. 
Bentham was a pioneer of Utilitarianism, proponents of his work support the development of law and 
policy that achieves an ideal balance of benefit versus harm as interpreted through measurable criteria. 
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“juridification of the lifeworld” critiqued by Habermas42, to a “technification of 
the lifeworld”—no less alienating in its failure to put human accountability at the 
heart of state action. The use of black box AI to deny benefits is deeply suspect, 
especially given the numerous examples of bias now emerging in large language 
models.43 
From a utilitarian perspective, it may seem strange to limit the state in this 
way, foregoing a chance for a judicial supercomputer to cross-correlate millions 
of variables. Language seems so weak a tool in comparison. However, its limits 
can be strengths.44 The burden of writing or speaking word by word ensures a line 
of thought capable of being comprehended (and challenged) by hearers. This 
idea is beautifully conveyed in Matthew Lopez’s The Inheritance, when an 
imagined E.M. Forster says to an aspiring writer: “All your ideas are at the 
starting post, ready to run. And yet they must all pass through a keyhole in order 
to begin the race.”45 Word by word, a text or talk can be understood, agreed with, 
or disputed. Until the ability to challenge machine learning methods is similarly 
accessible and democratized, we should be wary of entrusting AI with the 
evaluation of humans. And even then, hermeneutics are inescapable: much of 
what counts as genuine data of positive and negative outcomes will be up for 
debate, ensuring ineliminably human participation in the gathering of the data 
necessary for black box computation. All these challenges counsel against using 
black box AI in administrative adjudications of benefit determinations, especially 
when simpler and more transparent software is still in early stages of deployment. 
 
 
 42.  Habermas envisioned a dichotomy in 20th century society that split the conscious social acts and 
institutions driven by human consent in everyday life—the “lifeworld”—from that of acts and institutions 
that demand formalized conduct—the “system.” Through mounting “juridification of the lifeworld,” i.e., 
the increasing use of laws to govern everyday life, Habernas observed that decisions made for and by 
people in modern society were becoming increasingly distant from the volition of the people themselves. 
See Bohman, et al., Jürgen Habermas, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
Zalta ed., 2017) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/ [https://perma.cc/4EFR-DGCS]. 
 43.  EMILY M. BENDER, TIMNIT GEBRU, ANGELINA MCMILLAN-MAJOR, & MARGARET 
MITCHELL, ON THE DANGERS OF STOCHASTIC PARROTS: CAN LANGUAGE MODELS BE TOO BIG? 
(2021) https://faculty.washington.edu/ebender/papers/Stochastic_Parrots.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z59-
PS8A]. 
 44.  See Frank Pasquale, Foreword to IS LAW COMPUTABLE?, at xv (Deakin & Markou, eds., 2020) 
(arguing that language allows for flexibility a computer code cannot recreate). 
 45.  MATTHEW LOPEZ, THE INHERITANCE 5–8 (2018). 
